We re-visit Unclonable Encryption as introduced by Gottesman in 2003. We introduce two slightly different qubit-based prepare-and-measure Unclonable Encryption schemes with re-usable keys. We aim for low communication complexity and high rate. Our first scheme has low complexity but a sub-optimal rate. Our second scheme needs more rounds but has the advantage that it achieves the same rate as Quantum Key Distribution. We provide security proofs for both our schemes, based on the diamond norm distance, taking noise into account.
Introduction

Doing better than One-Time Pad encryption
Classically, the best confidentiality guarantee is provided by One-Time Pad (OTP) encryption. If Alice and Bob share a uniform n-bit secret key, they can exchange an n-bit message with information-theoretic security. In the classical setting Eve is able to save a copy of the ciphertext. For the message to remain secure in the future, two conditions must be met:
1. The key is used only once.
2. The key is never revealed.
If a quantum channel is available, these conditions can both be relaxed. (i) Quantum Key Recycling (QKR) [5, 11, 14] schemes provide a way of re-using encryption keys. (ii) Unclonable Encryption (UE) [9] guarantees that a message remains secure even if the keys leak at some time in the future. In this paper we introduce schemes that achieve both the key recycling and UE properties, and we explicitly prove that this can be achieved with low communication complexity and high rate. Our schemes act only on individual qubits with simple prepare-and-measure operations.
Quantum Key Recycling
The most famous use of a quantum channel in the context of cryptography is Quantum Key Distribution (QKD). First proposed in 1984 [4] , QKD allows Alice and Bob to extend a small key, used for authentication, to a longer key in an information-theoretically secure way. Combined with classical OTP encryption this lets Alice and Bob exchange messages with unconditional security. The QKD field has received a large amount of attention, resulting in QKD schemes that discard fewer qubits, various advanced proof techniques, improved noise tolerance, improved rates, use of EPR pairs, higher-dimensional quantum systems etc. [1, 2, 8, 10, 12, 15, [18] [19] [20] [21] . Much less known is that the concept of QKR was proposed two years before QKD [5] . QKR allows for the re-use of the secret encoding key when no disturbance is detected. QKD and QKR have a lot in common. (i) They both encode classical data in quantum states, in a basis that is not a priori known to Eve. (ii) They rely on the nocloning theorem [24] to guarantee that without disturbing the quantum state, Eve can not gain information about the classical payload or about the basis. The security of QKD has been well understood for a long time [e.g. 8, [18] [19] [20] , while a security proof for qubit-based QKR has been provided fairly recently [11] . A cipher with near optimal rate using high-dimensional qudits was introduced in 2005 [7] . Unfortunately, their method requires a quantum computer to perform encryption and decryption. In 2017, a way of doing authentication (and encryption) of quantum states with Key Recycling was proposed [17] . However this work did not lead to a prepare-and-measure variant. The main advantage of QKR over QKD+OTP is reduced round complexity: QKR needs only two rounds. After the communication from Alice to Bob, only a single bit of authenticated information needs to be sent back from Bob to Alice. Recently, it was shown that QKR over a noisy quantum channel can achieve the same communication rate as QKD (in terms of message bits per qubit) even if Alice sends only qubits [13] ; a further reduction of the total amount of communicated data.
Unclonable Encryption
In 2003, D. Gottesman introduced a scheme called Unclonable Encryption 1 (UE) [9] where the message remains secure even if the encryption keys leak at a later time (provided that no disturbance is detected). His work was motivated by the fact that on the one hand many protocols require keys to be deleted, but on the other hand permanent deletion of data from nonvolatile memory is a nontrivial task. In this light it is prudent to assume that all key material which is not immediately discarded is in danger of becoming public in the future; hence the UE security notion demands that the message stays safe even if all this key material is made public after Alice and Bob decide that they detected no disturbance. (In case disturbance is detected, the keys have to remain secret forever or permanently destroyed.) Gottesman remarked on the close relationship between UE and QKD, and in fact constructed a QKD variant from UE. The revealing of the basis choices in QKD is equivalent to revealing keys in UE. It is interesting to note that Gottesman's UE construction allows partial re-use of keys. However, it still expends one bit of key material per qubit sent. In the current paper we introduce qubit-based UE without key expenditure. Since QKR sends a message directly instead of establishing a key for later use, QKR protocols are natural candidates to have the UE property. In the case of noiseless quantum channels, the high-dimensional encryption scheme [7] and the qubit-based schemes [11, 14] seem to have UE; for noisy channels [14] with modified parameters also seems to have UE. However, none of these conjectures have been explicitly stated or proven, which is a shame since resilience against key leakage is an interesting security feature.
Contributions
We propose two prepare-and-measure Unclonable Encryption schemes with full key recycling. (These can also be viewed as two variants of the same basic idea.) Alice sends data to Bob in N chunks. Each chunk has a length of bits and is encoded into n qubits. Each chunk individually is tested by Bob for consistency (sufficiently low noise and valid MAC). In case of accept, Alice and Bob re-use their keys; in case of reject they have to access new key material. If the N 'th round was an accept, all key material of round N is assumed to become public. Our two protocol variants differ as follows:
• Variant 1. ('Embedded'). All communication from Alice to Bob is encoded directly into the qubits. A round consists of the qubits sent by Alice, and a one-bit feedback message returned by Bob. Over a noisy channel the rate is lower than the QKD rate.
• Variant 2. ('Interactive'). A round consists of four passes. After Bob has confirmed receipt of Alice's qubits, Alice sends a syndrome. Finally Bob sends a feedback bit. The rate equals the QKD rate.
We provide a security proof for each variant by upper bounding the diamond distance between the protocol and its idealized functionality. In particular, we use a reduction to the diamond distance that is associated with the security of QKD [18] . In the case of a noiseless channel this reduction is almost immediate, without involving any inequalities.
The Embedded variant has the advantage of low round complexity, but has a low rate; the Interactive variant achieves the QKD rate but its communication complexity (number of passes) is high. The rate reduction in the Embedded variant is given by n−k n , where n is the number of qubits and k the message length of the error-correcting code. The outline of the paper is as follows. After introducing notation and preliminaries in Section 3, we introduce the security definition in Section 4. We then discuss the details of the Embedded protocol (Section 5) and its security (Section 6). Next, we introduce and analyze the Interactive protocol (Section 7). Finally, in Section 8 we compare our schemes to existing qubit-based alternatives.
Preliminaries
Notation and terminology
Classical Random Variables are denoted with capital letters, and their realisations with lowercase letters. The expectation with respect to X is denoted as Ex f (x) = x∈X Pr[X = x]f (x). For the most significant bits of the string s we write s[: ]. The notation 'log' stands for the logarithm with base 2. The notation h stands for the binary entropy function h(p) = p log 1 p + (1 − p) log 1 1−p . Sometimes we write h(p 1 , . . . , p k ) meaning k i=1 p i log 1 p i . Bitwise XOR of binary strings is written as '⊕'. The Kronecker delta is denoted as δ ab . We will speak about 'the bit error rate β of a quantum channel'. This is defined as the probability that a classical bit x, sent by Alice embedded in a qubit, arrives at Bob's side as the flipped valuex. A linear error-correcting code with a × n generator matrix G can always be written in systematic form, G = (1 |Γ), where the × (n − ) matrix Γ contains the checksum relations. For message p ∈ {0, 1} , the codeword c p = p · G then has p as its first bits, followed by n − redundancy bits. For quantum states we use Dirac notation. A qubit with classical bit x encoded in basis b is written as |ψ b
x . The set of bases is B. In case of BB84 states we have B = {x, z}; in case of 6-state encoding B = {x, y, z}. The notation 'tr' stands for trace. Let A have eigenvalues λ i . The 1-norm of A is written as
States with non-italic label 'A', 'B' and 'E' indicate the subsystem of Alice/Bob/Eve. Consider classical variables X, Y and a quantum system under Eve's control that depends on X and Y . The combined classical-quantum state is ρ XY E = Exy |xy xy| ⊗ ρ E xy . The state of a sub-system is obtained by tracing out all the other subspaces, e.g. ρ Y E = tr X ρ XY E = Ey |y y| ⊗ ρ E y , with ρ E y = Ex ρ E xy . The fully mixed state on H A is denoted as χ A . We also use the notation µ X = Ex |x x| for a classical variable X that is not necessarily uniform. We write S(H) to denote the space of density matrices on Hilbert space H, i.e. positive semidefinite operators acting on H. Any quantum channel can be described by a completely positive trace-preserving (CPTP) map E : S(H A ) → S(H B ) that transforms a mixed state ρ A to ρ B : E(ρ A ) = ρ B . For a map E : S(H A ) → S(H B ), the notation E(ρ AC ) stands for (E ⊗ 1 C )(ρ AC ), i.e. E acts only on the A subsystem. Applying a map E 1 and then E 2 is written as the combined map E 2 • E 1 . The diamond norm of E is defined as E = 1 2 sup ρ AC ∈S(H AC ) E(ρ AC ) 1 with H C an auxiliary system that can be considered to be of the same dimension as H A . The diamond norm E − E can be used to bound the probability of distinguishing two CPTP maps E and E given that the process is observed once. The maximum probability of a correct guess is 1 2 + 1 4 E − E . In quantum cryptography, one proof technique considers Alice and Bob performing actions on noisy EPR pairs. These actions are described by a CPTP map E acting on the input EPR states and outputting classical outputs for Alice and Bob, and correlated quantum side information for Eve. The security of such a protocol is quantified by the diamond norm between the actual map E and an idealised map F which produces perfectly behaving outputs (e.g. perfectly secret QKD keys). When E − F ≤ ε we can consider E to behave ideally except with probability ε; this security metric is composable with other (sub-)protocols [20] . A family of hash functions H = {h : X → T } is called pairwise independent (a.k.a. 2independent or strongly universal) [23] if for all distinct pairs x, x ∈ X and all pairs y, y ∈ T it holds that Pr h∈H [h(x) = y∧h(x ) = y ] = |T | −2 . Here the probability is over random h ∈ H. We define the rate of a quantum communication protocol as the number of message bits communicated per sent qubit.
Post-selection
For protocols that are invariant under permutation of their inputs it has been shown [6] that security against collective attacks (same attack applied to each qubit individually) implies security against general attacks, at the cost of extra privacy amplification. Let E be a protocol that acts on S(H ⊗n AB ) and let F be the perfect functionality of that protocol. If for all input permutations π there exists a map K π on the output such that E • π = K π • E, then
where d is the dimension of the H AB space. (d = 4 for qubits). The product form σ ⊗n greatly simplifies the security analysis: now it suffices to prove security against 'collective' attacks, and to pay a price 2(d 2 − 1) log(n + 1) in the amount of privacy amplification, which is negligible compared to n.
Noise symmetrisation with random Pauli operators
In [18] it was shown that for n-EPR states in factorised form, as obtained from e.g. Postselection, a further simplification is possible. For each individual qubit j, Alice and Bob apply the Pauli operation σ α j to their half of the EPR pair, with α j ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3} random and public; then they forget α. The upshot is that Eve's state (the purification of the Alice+Bob system) is simplified to the 4 × 4 diagonal matrix Diag(1 − 3 2 γ, γ 2 , γ 2 , γ 2 ). Only one parameter is left over, the bit error probability γ caused by Eve. This symmetrisation trick is allowed when the statistics of the variables in the protocol is invariant under the Pauli operations.
Attacker model and security definitions 4.1 Attacker model
We work in same setting as Gottesman [9] , as discussed in Section 1.3. We distinguish between on the one hand long-term secrets (basis choices, encryption keys, authentication keys) and on the other hand short-term secrets. We consider two world views.
• World1. All secrets can be kept confidential indefinitely or destroyed.
• World2. Long-term keys are in danger of leaking at some point in time.
There are several motivations for entertaining the second world view. (a) It is difficult to permanently erase data from nonvolatile memory. (b) Whereas everyone understands the necessity of keeping message content confidential, it is not easy to guarantee that protocol implementations (and users) handle the keys with the same care as the messages. QKR protocols are typically designed to be secure in world1. In this paper we prove security guarantees that additionally hold in world2. One way of phrasing this is to say that we add 'user-proofness' to QKR. Alice sends data to Bob in N chunks. We refer to the sending of one chunk as a 'round'. In each round Bob tells Alice if he noticed a disturbance ('reject') or not ('accept'). In case of reject they are alarmed and they know that they must take special care to protect the keys of this round indefinitely (i.e. a fallback to World1 security). Crucially, we assume that a key theft occurring before the end of round N is immediately noticed by Alice and/or Bob. Without this assumption it would be impossible to do Key Recycling in a meaningful way. We allow all keys to become public after round N . The rest of the attacker model consists of the standard assumptions: no information, other than specified above, leaks from the labs of Alice and Bob; there are no side-channel attacks; Eve has unlimited (quantum) resources; all noise on the quantum channel is considered to be caused by Eve.
Security definitions
be the state after execution of a quantum encryption protocol, where M is the classical message, K stands for all the keys,K the updated keys, T the transcript observed by Eve, and E Eve's quantum side information. The two parts, associated with outcomes accept and reject respectively, are sub-normalized. In some existing protocols, e.g. [11] , the keys remain unchanged (K = K) in case of accept, whereas in other protocols, e.g. [13] , there is always a key update. The Encryption property (ENC) is defined as follows.
Furthermore we will work with the following definitions.
Note that other definitions exist. For instance, [11] has a recycling definition that allows Eve to have partial information about one of the keys (the measurement basis), as long as the min-entropy is high enough. Our preference for the above KR and UE definitions stems from (i) the fact that it allows for a unified treatment of all the keys; (ii) compatibility with the proof technique of [6, 18] , which makes it possible to prove security of high-rate schemes. Furthermore our KR definition is compatible with [7] . Also note that our KR and UE do not automatically imply ENC. The ENC property has to be considered as a separate requirement. For the combination of ENC and KR we have the following two lemmas.
Proof. Taking the lhs of (5) and tracing overK yields ε-ENC. Furthermore, using the triangle
Both terms individually are bounded by ε by the lhs of (5); the first term directly, the second term after taking theK-trace. This proves 2ε-KR.
Proof.
The first term is bounded by taking the trace over K and using ε 1 -ENC. For the second we take the trace over M , yielding ρ KT E accept −ρ K ⊗ρ T E accept 1 . This expression is bouned by ε 2 , which is seen by taking the M -trace of (3).
Lemma 1 allows us to prove both ENC and KR by upperbounding a single quantity. Lemma 2 is an important statement: any ENC scheme that upon accept re-uses its keys in unmodified form and satisfies KR is automatically a UE scheme. It is interesting to note that [11] hasK accept = K but does not satisfy KR, whereas [13, 14] satisfies KR but does not havẽ K accept = K. By Theorem 4 in [7] and Lemma 2, the high-dimensional scheme of Damgård et al. [7] has the UE property. One of the aims in our paper is to construct a qubit-based scheme that has both KR andK accept = K.
CPTP maps
We consider again the sequence of N chunks. The KR property must hold in the first N − 1 rounds. The ENC and UE property must hold in all rounds. We write the statements of Section 4.2 in terms of CPTP maps, to make contact with the proof technique of Section 3.2. The different nature of the KR and UE property forces us to introduce two different notations for the CPTP map that is executed by Alice and Bob. On the one hand, we write E KR for one round of the protocol, where at the end of the round the old keys (from the beginning of the round) are traced away. On the other hand, we write E UE for one round without such a tracing operation. (The ENC property is not made explicit in this notation.) The following condition implies that the above given security properties hold except with probability ε,
where the superscript is the round index, and F stands for the idealized version of the protocol. We can arrive at a simplified statement using the following lemma.
Lemma 3 For any CPTP maps A, A , B, B , it holds that
Proof:
where the last inequality holds because a CPTP map can never increase the trace distance.
Using Lemma 3 it is easily seen that the following condition implies (7),
It is therefore sufficient to upper bound the single-round quantities E KR − F KR and E UE − F UE . The ideal mapping F is obtained from E as follows. From E(ρ ABE ) one traces out those classical variables that are supposed to remain unknown to Eve, and takes a tensor product with an isolated mixed state of these variables. In the case of E KR the relevant variables are the message m and the next-round keys, which we denote here ask. In the case of E UE it is only the message, and only the accept part of the mapping is relevant. (Upon reject the functionality of E UE is ideal by definition.) Hence we have
where in (14) the reject part vanishes as we have implicitly assumed that E has ideal functionality in the reject case, i.e. ENC holds.
Description of the 'Embedded' protocol variant 5.1 Pairwise independent hashing with easy inversion
We will need the privacy amplification step to be easily computable in two directions. Unfortunately the code-based construction due to Gottesman [9] does not work with the proof technique of [18] , which requires a family of universal hash functions. We will be using a family of invertible functions F : {0, 1} ν → {0, 1} ν that has the collision properties of a pairwise independent hash function. An easy way to construct such a family is to use multiplication in GF (2 ν ). Let u ∈ GF (2 ν ) be randomly chosen. Define F u (x) = u · x, where the multiplication is in GF (2 ν ). A pairwise independent family of hash functions Φ from {0, 1} ν to {0, 1} , with ≤ ν, is implemented by taking the most significant bits of F u (x). We denote this as
The inverse operation is as follows. Given c ∈ {0, 1} , generate random r ∈ {0, 1} ν− and output F inv u (c||r). It obviously holds that Φ u (F inv u (c||r)) = c. Computing an inverse in GF (2 ν ) costs O(ν log 2 ν) operations [16] . OTP , e (j) } N j=1 , and if round N was accept also z (N ) . Remarks:
Protocol steps of the 'Embedded' variant
• The augmented message m contains the three keysk fb ,k OTP ,ẽ for the next round. This means that qubits are 'spent' in order to send something other than µ, which reduces the communication rate. Here the mask e ∈ {0, 1} n−k for the redundancy bits is the dominant part; its size is asymptotically nh(β) bits, giving rise to a rate penalty term h(β) familiar from QKD.
Next round keys in Accept case: • The accept/reject feedback bit is encrypted, which temporarily prevents Eve from gaining information from 'oracle' access to the feedback. This allows us to re-use b in unmodified form after accept.
• Even in the case of known plaintext, from Eve's point of view the 'payload' x ∈ {0, 1} n in the state n i=1 |ψ b i x i is uniformly distributed. The z masks bits; then appending r increases that to k bits; finally the e masks the n − k redundancy bits.
EPR version of the 'Embedded' protocol
We will base the security proof on the EPR version of the protocol, making use of Postselection (Section 3.2) and the random-Pauli noise symmetrisation technique (Section 3.3). n noisy singlet states are produced by an untrusted source, e.g. Eve. One half of each EPR pair is sent to Alice, the other half to Bob. Alice and Bob apply the random Pauli operations as described in Section 3.3. Then Alice measures her qubits in the bases b ∈ B n resulting in a string s ∈ {0, 1} n . Bob too measures his qubits in basis b, which yields t ∈ {0, 1} n . Alice computes x as specified in Section 5.2, then computes a = x ⊕ s and sends a to Bob over an authenticated classical channel. Bob receives a, computes x =t ⊕ a and performs the decryption steps specified in Section 5.2. We are allowed to use Post-selection because our protocol is invariant under permutation of the EPR pairs. A permutation re-arranges the noise in the observed strings s and t over the bit positions {1, . . . , n}; however, the error correction step is insensitive to such a change.
The use of the noise symmetrisation technique is allowed because the statistics is invariant under the Pauli operations. In the case of BB84 encoding and 6-state encoding, the Paulis cause bit flips in the string x ∈ {0, 1} n in positions known to Alice and Bob, which does not change the protocol in any essential way. 3 Security of the EPR version implies security of the prepare-and-measure protocol of Section 5.2.
6 Security proof for the EPR 'Embedded' protocol 6 
.1 CPTP maps
We now specify the exact form of the CPTP map which represents one round. We start with E UE and write E KR = T KR •E UE , where T KR is a partial trace operation. The E UE can be viewed as four consecutive maps: an initialization step I where the input variables are prepared; a measurement step M; a post-processing step P representing all further computations; a partial trace step T UE where all variables that are not part of the output or the transcript are traced away,
The initialization merely appends the input variables,
Here b, z, u, e are uniform, but m not necessarily. The measurement acts on the b-space and ρ ABE , outputting the strings s, t and Eve's state ρ E bst , which is correlated to the measurement basis b and the outcomes s, t,
Here the distribution of s and t is governed by the i.i.d. noise with noise parameter γ. The marginals of s and t are uniform, while for all j ∈ {1, . . . , n} it holds that Pr[s j = t j ] = γ.
In the post-processing the flag ω is computed as a function of s and t which we will denote as θ st . Let nβ be the number of errors that can be corrected by the error-correcting code. Then
We will use the notation P corr (n, β, γ) for the probability of the event θ st = 1.
The result of applying I, M, P is given by
Here r is uniform and 'Red(p)' stands for the redundancy bits appended to p in the systematicform ECC encoding Enc(p). In the final step T UE we trace away all variables that are not part of the transcript or the output: s, t, c, p, x, x , r. These variables exist only temporarily and can be quickly discarded by Alice and Bob; they are never stored in nonvolatile memory. The a and ω are observed by Eve as part of the communication. (The ω in encrypted form, but the key is assumed to leak in the future.) The b, z, u, e are assumed to leak in the future and thus they have to be kept as part of the state. We obtain 4
As discussed in Section 4, only the accept part (the ω = 1 part) of the idealized F UE is relevant. This is obtained as F accept UE
Note that this expression is sub-normalized; its trace equals P corr . We write
For the description of E KR we have to take (22) and trace out z, e, ω.
The ideal functionality F KR has m, b, u,z decoupled from the rest of the system. We have
Note that Est Eb ρ E b st = ρ E . Lemma 4 Let ρ ABE denote the purification of a 4 n -dimensional state ρ AB . Let b ∈ B n be a qubit-wise orthonormal basis. It holds that ρ E b = ρ E . Proof: Let P A bs denote a projection operator on subsystem 'A' corresponding to a measurement in basis b with outcome s ∈ {0, 1} n . We have ρ
We use the fact that s P A bs = 1 and t P B bt = 1 for any b. 
Intermezzo: QKD asymptotics
In Appendix A, we consider a version of QKD where privacy amplification is implemented as in Section 5.2, and the syndrome is sent to Bob in OTP'ed form; we show that this leads to a bound of the form
which after some algebra gives rise to
and that from (29) the well known asymptotic QKD rates is obtained: 1−2h(β) for BB84 and 1 − h(1 − 3β 2 , β 2 , β 2 , β 2 ) for 6-state QKD. If the syndrome (σ = Syn x) is sent in the clear, the right hand side of (28) acquires an extra σ outside the trace norm and a factor δ σ,Syn(s⊕a) inside the trace norm; the effect on (29) is an extra factor 2 n−k under the square root; while this alteration reduces the threshold value max by an amount n − k, it has no effect on the rate since OTP'ing the syndrome would incur a penalty of exactly the same size.
Achievable rate of the Embedded variant
In the analysis we do not explicitly write down contributions from the authentication failure probability. It is implicit that each MAC adds a term 2 −λ to the overall security parameter. 
In other words, the achievable rate is worse than the QKD rate by a term h(β). Proof of Theorem 1: Because of the inclusion of n − k + λ + 1 extra bits in the augmented message m, the asymptotic rate of the protocol is r embedded = max /n − h(β). We need to determine the value of max for both the UE and KR property separately and take the smaller of the two. Part 1. First we note that (24) is the difference of two sub-normalised states that both have trace equal to P corr . This immediately yields the bound E UE − F UE ≤ P corr . Furthermore, from (24) we get
(31) which resembles (28). The main difference is the 2 n−k p δ s⊕a,p [Red(p)⊕e] . In the derivation as shown in Appendix A, upon doubling as in (43) applying the Eu then yields instead of δ ss the following expression, The factor (2 n−k ) 2 δ e,··· , together with the Ee outside the trace norm, together have the same effect as having the plaintext syndrome in the QKD derivation: a factor 2 n−k under the square root in (29). Asymptotically this yields uncl,4state max = n − 2nh(β) and uncl,6state max = n − nh(1 − 3β 2 , β 2 , β 2 , β 2 ). Part 2. First we note that (27) is the difference of two sub-normalised states that both have trace equal to P corr . This immediately yields the bound E KR − F KR ≤ P corr . Furthermore, from (27) we find
This expression very closely resembles (28), withz precisely playing the role of c, and the term Em δ c,m ⊕Φu(a⊕s) replaced by the constant '1'. Carrying the '1' through steps (43) and further in Appendix A yields the same result as the QKD derivation, except for one important difference: the (s + a)[: k] restriction to the first k bits yields a modification of δ ss to the first k bits only. In the end result the parameter n is entirely replaced by k.
Hence we obtain asymptotically KR,4state max = k − kh(β) = n(1 − h(β)) 2 and KR,6state
. It is easily seen that UE max ≤ KR max . For brevity we use shorthand notation h = h(β) and H = h(1 − 3β 2 , β 2 , β 2 , β 2 ), noting that H > h and H < 2h. For BB84 encoding we see KR
Note that we are not allowed to invoke Lemma 2, since not all the key material is carried to the next round in unmodified form: upon accept the e, k fb , k OTP are updated. For k fb and k OTP this is not so relevant, as the effect of these keys can be depicted as 'external' to the proof, e.g. the existence of an authenticated channel. The e on the other hand plays an integral role in the bounding of the diamond norm (31) and cannot be moved outside that part of the proof. 7 The 'Interactive' protocol
Protocol steps of the 'Interactive' variant
If we don't restrict ourselves to a single communication from Alice to Bob, and allow Alice to send classical data as well, we can handle the syndrome more efficiently than in the Embedded variant. Alice sends the syndrome in plaintext, but only after getting from Bob a confirmation that he has received the qubits. The protocol steps are written out in Appendix B. A single round is depicted in Fig. 2 . Remark:
• In the case of a noiseless quantum channel, there is no need to send the syndrome, and the two protocol variants become identical. Furthermore, the diamond norm reduces exactly to the expression for QKD.
• Alice has to wait for the feedback τ 2 , otherwise Eve's attack on the quantum state would depend on Syn x, something that the proof technique cannot handle.
• Upon accept, all keys except for a couple of small feedback and MAC keys are re-used in unmodified form. Hence it becomes possible to use Lemma 2 in the security proof.
Decoding: Indicate arrival n states: ⌧ 2 = (k 1 fb , 1)
Take random  2 {0, 1} 3 +1 and r 2 {0, 1} n T ag: Proof: We work with the EPR version, i.e. there are additional variables s, t, a ∈ {0, 1} n just as in Section 5.3. We write G, J instead of E, F to distinguish from the Embedded case. Using the same methods as in Section 6.1 (maps for initialisation, measurement, postprocessing and tracing) we first derive the map G UE that corresponds to one round of the protocol. We have 5
from which we obtain 
Again we have the difference of two sub-normalised terms and conclude G UE −J UE ≤ P corr . Next we note that (35) is practically identical to the QKD expression (41) with an extra constraint δ e,Syn(a⊕s) thrown in. The effect of this constraint is exactly as in the derivation for QKD with syndrome-in-the-clear. We get asymptotically UE max = nr QKD . The G KR is obtained by tracing out z, ω from (34), which yields
The ideal functionality J KR has m, b, u,z decoupled from the rest of the system. Following the recipe for obtaining J from G as in Section 6.1 we get
(37) Again we have the difference of two norm-P corr terms and conclude G KR − J KR ≤ P corr . Furthermore (37) gives
This is almost identical to the corresponding expression for QKD with syndrome-in-the-clear, except for the constant '1' which does not affect the final result. Remark: In the proof above, instead of deriving the UE max we could have invoked Lemma 2 and obtained the same rate.
Communication rate and complexity
We briefly comment on the communication complexity (round complexity) and the asymptotic rate of our protocols as compared to other schemes. The word 'round complexity' here is not to be confused with the N rounds in our protocol. We count the number of times Alice has to send something per message µ and refer to this number as Alice's number of passes. The rate is defined as |µ|/n, the size of the message divided by the number of qubits. We compare against the following methods for sending a message with information-theoretic security without using up 6 key material,
• QKD+OTP. Key establishment using Quantum Key Distribution, followed by One Time Pad classical encryption. We consider efficient QKD with negligible waste of qubits [15] and the smallest possible number of communication rounds: only 2 passes by Alice.
• QKR. Qubit-wise prepare-and-measure Quantum Key Recycling as described in [13, 14] . Only a single pass by Alice is needed, since Alice and Bob already share key material.
• QKD+Uncl. Key establishment using Quantum Key Distribution, followed by Gottesman's Unclonable Encryption [9] . At least two passes by Alice are needed.
The scheme properties are summarised in Table 1 , and the rates 7 are plotted in Fig. 3 We also briefly comment on the key sizes. 
Gottesman's scheme has somewhat shorter keys, total length |µ| 2 h( ) 1 2h( ) + O(1), but it needs to refresh ⇡ |µ|/[1 2h( )] bits.
Discussion
We have shown a Quantum Key Recycling protocol similar to [9] can be Unclonable as well as have Key Recycling. Essentially, this is done by taking a QKR protocol and making the privacy amplification a step in computing the qubit payload. The construction of Gottesman does something very similar but doesn't allow us to prove key recycling properties since the privacy amplification is not done with a family of hash functions.
One might expect the Gottesman construction for privacy amplification to perform better than our embedded protocol since his privacy amplification takes the entire qubit payload as input, while ours has n k bits less input. However, our embedded protocol has a reduced rate because we aren't able to re-use one of the keys (e), not because of a too small input size to our hash function used for privacy amplification. Refreshing a key in this setting has a double penalty on the rate. On the one hand you need to use part of the message to refresh your key material, on the other hand you still require the Unclonability property which is not helped by using a one-time key. Note that a QKD protocol with reduced round complexity in the Unclonable setting su↵ers from the same reduction in communication rate. Intuitively we would expect e to be only partially known to Eve and imagine the rate could be improved by not throwing away all of e but e.g. using part of e as an input to a hash function to compute a next round key. Attempting this with our proof method doesn't yield the desired outcome. Perhaps other proof techniques can.
Our protocol now assumes the transfer of data in blocks. In this scenario it makes sense to assume the Accept/Reject bit can be kept secret. This allows the full re-use of b rather than having to refresh it somehow as well or having the entropy drop with every use as in [8] . Partially refreshing b could lift this restriction. There may also be other scenarios thinkable where it is reasonable to but with slightly higher rates.) QKR is an improvement over QKD in terms of round complexity, while achieving the same rate. However, QKD and QKR do not have the Unclonable Encryption property. The only known UE option until now was 'QKD+Uncl'. Our Interactive scheme has the same round complexity as QKD+Uncl but a significantly higher rate. Our Embedded scheme has a better round complexity than QKD+Uncl; furthermore it has a better rate at noise levels below β ≈ 0.052. We also briefly comment on the key sizes. The key material used in the Embedded variant consists of the OTP z ∈ {0, 1} , the hash seed u ∈ {0, 1} k , the basis choice B ∈ B n , the redundancy mask e ∈ {0, 1} n−k , the authentication keys k MAC ∈ {0, 1} λ , k fb ∈ {0, 1} λ and the OTP k OTP ∈ {0, 1}. Counting only contributions proportional to n, the total size in bits is + n + n log B + O(1). With ≈ |µ| + nh(β) and n ≈ |µ|/[1 − 3h(β)] we can write the total size as |µ| 2+log |B|−2h(β) 1−3h(β) + O(1). In the Interactive variant, the large keys are z ∈ {0, 1} , u ∈ {0, 1} n and b ∈ B n . With ≈ |µ| and n ≈ |µ|/[1 − 2h(β)] we can express the total key size as |µ| 2+log |B|−2h(β)
1−2h(β)
+ O(1). The keys are expended over a block of N rounds (or ≤ N in case of reject). If there are no rejects, the 'amortised' key expenditure per round equals the above key size divided by N , which can be made much smaller than |µ|. Gottesman's scheme has somewhat shorter keys, total length |µ| 2−h(β) 1−2h(β) + O(1), but it needs to refresh ≈ |µ|/[1 − 2h(β)] bits every round.
Discussion
We have proven, in the proof framework developed by Renner et al., that quantum encryption can have Unclonability (as defined by Gottesman) as well as Key Recycling. We achieved this by starting from QKR and making the privacy amplification a step in the computation of the qubit payload. Gottesman's construction [9] does something very similar, and hence one might try to construct a variant of the Embedded and Interactive protocols that is closer to [9] . This would have the advantage that there is no longer a seed u that needs to be stored as part of the keys, as [9] employs ECC-based privacy amplification. However, the proof technique that we use, with its reliance on hash families, does not work for ECC-based privacy amplification. We suspect that the rate decrease from 1 − 2h(β) to 1 − 3h(β) which occurs when we 'embed' everything in the quantum state is unavoidable. While the Interactive variant does not need to protect the syndrome/redundancy, the Embedded variant does, but at the same time cannot because the keys get revealed. The price paid is to reserve space nh(β) in the message to refresh the redundancy encryption key. This is closely linked to the fact that thek accept = k property in Lemma 2 is difficult to reconcile with the use of a redundancy-masking key e. Our protocols (temporarily) hide the accept/reject feedback bit ω. This is a technicality that allows us to re-use b in un-altered form. The alternative would be to send ω in the clear and then either (i) partially refresh b as in [14] , or (ii) find a way to cope with a reduced entropy of b as in [11] . Note that it is not realistic to hide a large accumulation of ω-feedbacks from Eve. Alice and Bob would have to act for a long time in a way that, to an external observer, does not depend on the ωs. However, Eve may be able to observe e.g. how often Alice and Bob have to engage in QKD to refill their key 'reservoir', which reveals the total number of rejects. For a small accumulation (e.g. size N ) we expect that it is realistic to hide the feedbacks temporarily. The downside associated with encoding a message directly into qubits is the vulnerability to erasures (particle loss) on the quantum channel. Whereas QKD can just ignore erasures, in QKR they have to be compensated by the error-correcting code, which incurs a serious rate penalty.
In case of reject: Re-use b, u, k MAC . Take freshz,k 1 fb ,k 2 fb ,k 2 MAC ,k OTP from k rej .
